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Background: The requirement that animals be used in research and testing in order to protect humans was
formalized in the Nuremberg Code and subsequent national and international laws, codes, and declarations.
Discussion: We review the history of these requirements and contrast what was known via science about animal
models then with what is known now. We further analyze the predictive value of animal models when used as test
subjects for human response to drugs and disease. We explore the use of animals for models in toxicity testing as
an example of the problem with using animal models.
Summary: We conclude that the requirements for animal testing found in the Nuremberg Code were based on
scientifically outdated principles, compromised by people with a vested interest in animal experimentation, serve
no useful function, increase the cost of drug development, and prevent otherwise safe and efficacious drugs and
therapies from being implemented.
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Using animals to learn more about life in general and
humans in particular dates back to ancient times. In the
first century BCE, researchers dissected the optic nerve
in living animals, vivisected a pig while it was swallowing
colored water in order to evaluate the action, and
observed intact beating hearts [1]. Animal experimenta-
tion continued with Galen in the first century CE but
modern animal use in research and testing dates to
Claude Bernard in 19th century France [2].
The notion that testing chemicals on animals could be
predictive of human responses and therefore should be
legally mandated dates back to the 1930s, when the sulfa
drugs were being introduced for infections. Sulfa drugs
were some of the first drugs that were shown to be ef-
fective against certain bacterial infections, but they were
difficult to dissolve in solution. This was a problem, as
children usually require a liquid version of a medication
because they will not swallow pills. In 1937, one sulfa
drug was dissolved in ethylene glycol and subsequently
administered to children and adults. The ethylene glycol,* Correspondence: drraygreek@gmail.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orwhich is well-known today as an ingredient in anti-
freeze, killed one hundred and seven people. This inci-
dent led directly to the enactment of the US Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to mandate some
animal testing [3].
The Nuremberg Code came out of a trial in post-war
Germany in December of 1946, the second of the
Nuremberg trials. The first tried 24 Nazis, including
Hermann Göring and Rudolf Hess, at the International
Military Tribunal for crimes against humanity. This first
trial lasted eight months with ultimately seven of the 24
defendants being executed. Some were sentenced in
absentia, some were acquitted, some committed suicide
or could not be tried for medical reasons, and others
were incarcerated [4].
As the first trial progressed it became obvious that more
people were responsible than merely the 24 under scru-
tiny, so a total of 12 more trials were held [5]. These trials
were held before US military tribunals, with the sole trier
of fact being the United States. Thus the second trial was
formally designated United States of America v. Karl
Brandt et al., colloquially referred to as the “Doctors’
Trial” or the “Medical Case.” Four judges presided over
the eight-month case, hearing 85 witnesses, and viewing
1,471 documents and 11,538 pages of transcript [6].td. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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been singled out as being responsible for the execution of
humans they deemed “unworthy of life” and for experi-
ments conducted on concentration camp prisoners.
Experiments contained in the indictments included those
pertaining to treatments for persons who had been se-
verely chilled, the effects of various poisons and vaccines,
and testing for pharmaceutical treatments for phosphorus
burns from incendiary bombs. All of the experiments were
performed on unconsenting humans who were inmates of
concentration camps [7]. The defendants were charged
with and tried for conspiracy to commit war crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against human-
ity. The tribunal did not convict on the first charge; 15 of
the defendants were convicted on counts two and three.
Ten of the 23 defendants were further charged with, and
found guilty of, membership in a criminal organization
(the SS) [7]. The Nuremberg Code also came out of these
proceedings, comprising ten ethical ideals that strive to lay
the groundwork for ensuring that human rights are
respected in human experimentation.
The American Medical Association appointed an ad-
visor to the prosecutor for US v. Brandt, Dr Andrew
C Ivy [8]. Ivy was a scientist himself and had con-
ducted research similar to what was being discussed at
the trial, such as the effects of altitude on pilots [9].
Ivy was also a staunch opponent of those seeking to
remove animals from laboratories during the 1930s
and 1940s. He was a co-founder of the National Soci-
ety for Medical Research, an organization that cam-
paigned in favor of animal experiments, and served as
its secretary-treasurer for years. It was Ivy who wrote
the manuscript the prosecutors used to evaluate the
scientific aspects of the charges [10,11]. This manu-
script included:
The experiment to be performed must be so designed
and based on the results of animal experimentation
and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease
under study that the anticipated results will justify the
performance of the experiment. . . . The experiment
must be conducted . . . on the basis of the results of
previous adequate animal experimentation, there is no
a priori reason to believe that death or disabling
injury will occur, except in such experiments as those
on Yellow Fever where the experimenters serve as
subjects along with non-scientific personnel.
The American Medical Association quickly adopted Ivy’s
rules and this was presented at Nuremberg in such a way
as to make it appear that the rules were well established in
the US ([10,11] also see [12]). Ivy’s wording would appear
almost verbatim in the ultimate Nuremberg Code. The
Declaration of Helsinki, authored by the World MedicalAssociation, was a medical adaption of the Nuremberg
Code and came out in 1964. It has been revised six times
since then. The Declaration of Helsinki [13] came to
supersede the Nuremberg Code as the normative ethical
guidance for medical researchers [6]. The Declaration of
Helsinki represents an improvement over the Nuremberg
Code in the sense that it balances the concerns of indivi-
duals against the benefits to the society [14].
Both the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of
Helsinki indicate that animal-based research should be
conducted before human experimentation, the former
more unequivocally than the latter. Principle 3 of the
Nuremberg Code states:
The experiment should be so designed and based on
the results of animal experimentation and a
knowledge of the natural history of the disease or
other problem under study that the anticipated results
will justify the performance of the experiment [15].
(Emphasis added.)
This principle is predicated on the assumption that the
animal experimentation will have predictive value for the
efficacy of the ultimate experimentation on humans. Iron-
ically, experiments were also conducted on animals in
Nazi Germany despite the commonly held position that
they were not [16-20]. The following is from a document
presented at the Doctor’s Trial (USA v. Karl Brandt, et al.)
at Nuremberg and is titled “The Blood Picture of the
White Mouse in Experimental Infections and Chemother-
apy” (spelling per the original document).
In former works 1) we have reported on the
application of hematolytic technique to prove the
functional condition of the mesenchyma in artificially
infected animals and chemotherapeut treatment. The
differential blood picture in normal mice as we as in
mice infected with recurring spirochetes and nagana
trypanosomes treated with salvarsan and solganol was
only briefly discussed and publication at a later date
was promised. . . . To cause hyperemia the tails of the
mice was dipped for a short while into water of 40oC,
were severed and a drop . . .
Principle 12 of the Declaration of Helsinki advises that
medical research on humans must be based on animal ex-
perimentation as appropriate. Again, the assumption is
that animal experimentation will have predictive value for
human research or experimentation, thus protecting
human rights. As we will see, the opposite is the case: reli-
ance on animal-based research in conducting human ex-
perimentation is antithetical to a respect for human rights.
Neither the Nuremberg Code nor the Declaration of
Helsinki is legally binding or legally enforceable in its own
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documents and the principles enshrined in them will be
persuasive authority to any domestic court, and indeed an
argument can be made that many if not most of the prin-
ciples are customary law (i.e. international law, binding on
all states, that is derived from the customary behaviour of
states, indicating a consensus that the behaviour is obliga-
tory). Requiring consent in experiments, for example, may
be considered a principle of customary international law,
and states may have recourse at the International Court of
Justice if this principle is violated. However, international
codes and declarations gain tangible lawful force for indi-
viduals when they are adopted into domestic laws. The
USA Protection of Human Subjects [22] reads as follows:
}46.118 Applications and proposals lacking definite
plans for involvement of human subjects.
Certain types of applications for grants, cooperative
agreements, or contracts are submitted to
departments or agencies with the knowledge that
subjects may be involved within the period of support,
but definite plans would not normally be set forth in
the application or proposal. These include activities
such as institutional type grants when selection of
specific projects is the institution's responsibility;
research training grants in which the activities
involving subjects remain to be selected; and projects
in which human subjects' involvement will depend
upon completion of instruments, prior animal studies,
or purification of compounds.
}46.204 Research involving pregnant women or fetuses.
Pregnant women or fetuses may be involved in
research if all of the following conditions are met:
(a) Where scientifically appropriate, preclinical studies,
including studies on pregnant animals, and clinical
studies, including studies on nonpregnant women,
have been conducted and provide data for assessing
potential risks to pregnant women and fetuses . . .
(Emphasis added.)
In Canada, s. 30 of the Food and Drugs Act [22] provides
that the Governor in Council may make regulations for
carrying the purposes and provisions of the Act into effect.
The consequent Food and Drugs Regulations [23] reference
animal-based research in at least three separate provisions.
Provision C.08.002.01 provides that a manufacturer of a
new drug may file an extraordinary use new drug submis-
sion if the new drug is intended for:
(i) emergency use in situations where persons have
been exposed to a chemical, biological, radiological
or nuclear substance and action is required to treat,
mitigate or prevent a life-threatening or other
serious disease, disorder or abnormal physical state,or its symptoms, that results, or is likely to result,
from that exposure, or
(ii) preventative use in persons who are at risk of
exposure to a chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear substance that is potentially lethal or
permanently disabling; and
However, s. C.08.002.01(2)(iv) requires that the sub-
mission for extraordinary use new drugs contains:
(iv) detailed reports of studies, in an animal species that
is expected to react with a response that is
predictive for humans, establishing the safety of the
new drug, and providing substantial evidence of its
effect, when used for the purpose and under the
conditions of use recommended,
(v) information confirming that the end point of
animal studies is clearly related to the desired
benefit in humans,
(vi) information demonstrating that there is a sufficient
understanding of the pharmacokinetics and
pharmacodynamics of the new drug in animals and
in humans to enable inferences to be drawn in
respect of humans so as to allow for the selection
of an effective dose in humans, . . .
Other provisions in the Regulations suggest an assump-
tion that animal-based research has predictive value for
humans, although interestingly, none—other than the
foregoing—require the results of animal-based research.
Rather, it is indicated that when animal-based research
exists its results should be included in applications for
drug authorization. In other words, with the exception of
extraordinary use drugs, animal-based research does not
appear to be mandated under the Regulations.
For example, provision C.05.005(e) provides that an
application to sell or import a drug for a clinical trial in-
volving human subjects shall contain an investigator’s
brochure containing a variety of information, including
(ii) the pharmacological aspects of the drug, including
its metabolites in all animal species tested,
(iii)the pharmacokinetics of the drug and the drug
metabolism, including the biological transformation
of the drug in all animal species tested,
(iv)any toxicological effects in any animal species tested
under a single dose study, a repeated dose study or
a special study in respect of the drug,
(v) any results of carcinogenicity studies in any animal
species tested in respect of the drug, . . . [Emphasis
added.]
Only when animal species have been tested should
that information be included in the application. If the
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aspects, and carcinogenicity of the drug can be demon-
strated using non-animal models, this is sufficient.
Regulations are law that is not enacted by the legislature,
but rather is created by those to whom authority has been
delegated under the governing act. They can be amended
by the delegated authority. The Food and Drugs Act allows
the Governor in Council, whose decision-making is, in
practice, undertaken by cabinet, to make regulations for
that act. Moreover, all federal regulation-making in Canada
is governed by the Statutory Instruments Act [24]. Section
19.1(1) of the SIA provides that a legislative committee may
revoke all or part of any regulations. The development, im-
plementation, evaluation, and review of regulations are fur-
ther governed by the Cabinet Directive on Streamlining
Regulation. Among other things, this policy document
requires the federal government to protect and advance the
public interest in health, to make decisions based on evi-
dence and the best available science, and to be efficient and
effective by demonstrating tangible results for humans. If
animal-based research does not advance the public interest,
is not scientifically valid, and/or does not demonstrate tan-
gible results for humans, then it cannot be required under
federal regulations such as the Food and Drug Regulations.
In 2009, animal testing to fulfill regulatory requirements,
category PAU 3, accounted for 66% (96,211 animals) of
Canadian experiments known to “cause pain near, at, or
above the pain tolerance threshold of unanesthetized, con-
scious animals” [25].
Similarly, the US Food and Drug regulations stipulate that
results from animal-based research should be included in
applications if it has been conducted (e.g. s. 314.50), but the
plain meaning of the text is that it is not mandated. For ex-
ample, Part 314, Subpart I of the Food and Drug Regulations
set out standards for the “approval of new drugs when
human efficacy studies are not ethical or feasible.” In such
circumstances, the FDA will accept “adequate and well-
controlled animal studies when the results of those animal
studies establish that the drug product is reasonably likely to
produce clinical benefit in humans.” The presumption
underlying these regulations is that animal studies have pre-
dictive value for humans. The FDA does not require proof
of efficacy in animal models while they do in practice
mandate toxicity testing in animals. This should be inter-
preted in light of the fact that what the FDA requires differs
from what the FDA accepts and in some cases this is a dis-
tinction without a difference. If efficacy has not been
demonstrated in an animal model, the investigational new
drug approval process can be far more complicated and dif-
ficult. In addition, there is variability in the approval process.
Nevertheless, the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) states that it requires animal testing on a rodent and
nonrodent species in order to determine toxicity in humans,
the dose to administer to humans taking a new drug for thefirst time, in order to establish a margin of safety, and for
monitoring purposes during clinical trials [26].
Discussion
Science - theory
At the time of the Nuremberg trials, medical science
was very different than it is now. The structure of DNA
had not been elucidated, scientists thought the polio-
virus entered via the nose (it enters through the gut)
[27], the notion of a magic bullet (that for every disease,
or at least every infectious disease, a chemical existed
that could interact with the single site causing the mal-
ady and thus cure the disease without harming the rest
of the body) via Ehrlich and Salvarsan [28] was foremost
in the minds of drug developers, the modern synthesis
in evolution was brand new [29], and animals and
humans seemed to be more or less the same except for
humans having a soul [2,30,31]. There were no organ
transplants, infectious diseases were still a major killer
in the developed world, the fields of cognitive ethology
and animal cognition were unheard of, and differences
between ethnic groups [32-38] and sexes [39-43] in
terms of disease and drug reactions had not yet been
discovered. Physics was just beginning to cast off the
shackles of determinism and reductionism but chaos
and complexity theory was still on the horizon. It was a
different world. People in the 1940s are to be excused
for thinking that animals and humans would react more
or less the same to drugs and disease. We will now bring
the reader into the current scientific environment as it
relates to our topic [30,44-49].
Two major advances in science, as it relates to our topic,
have occurred since the Nuremberg trials. First, the field
of evolutionary biology continued to develop. The new
division of evolutionary biology known as evolutionary de-
velopmental biology, or evo devo, is one example of the
important advances in the field of evolution. Evo devo
arguably began in 1978, when Lewis [50] published his
findings on the anterior–posterior layout of the fruit fly,
Drosophila. In 1984, the homeobox genes were discovered
by McGinnis et al. [51]. The homeobox genes are
responsible for the body plan of “bilaterian” organisms.
Bilaterians, of which humans are an example, are symmet-
rical around two axes. The homeobox genes are respon-
sible for the way the body is configured: the arms here, the
thorax there and so on [52]. The homeobox are active
in early embryogenesis, organizing the cell and anterior–
posterior body layout [53]. While there are differences
among species—for example, there are nine homeobox
genes in flies contrasted with thirty-nine in mammals—
the overall use of the homeobox is the same. Discoveries
such as the homeobox allowed scientists to appreciate the
fact that mammals, and animals in general, have much in
common in terms of their genetic composition. The
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explained by different species having different genes.
The concepts learned from evo devo and evolutionary
biology in general tie in closely with discoveries from the
Human Genome Project (HGP) [54,55] and other spin-off
projects. Prior to the HGP, scientists thought the number of
genes was proportional to the complexity of the organism.
The number of genes in some organisms was known or
approximated; therefore, the scientists involved in the HGP
were looking for an estimated 100,000+ genes in humans.
As the project advanced, it became clear that humans had
nowhere near this many genes. This was perplexing.
Because of evo devo, the HGP and its spinoffs, and
speculation by King and Wilson [56] in the 1970s, scientists
now know the following. All mammals have more or less
the same genes. Some species have a few genes that other
species do not have, but one could more or less build any
mammal using the genes from another. The differences
among species lie, in large part, in the regulation and
expression of the same genes. The genes that build the body
are known as structural genes, while the genes that turn
the structural gene on and off are called regulatory genes.
Think of your genetic composition as the keys on a piano.Figure 1 Thumb position and finger length among primates.Every piano has the same keys (structural genes). But each
piano can be played so as to produce a variety of tunes.
The reason for this is that the structure of the piano allows
for keys to be pressed at various intervals and in various
combinations. The sheet music dictates when and how to
press the keys. Likewise, the regulatory genes (the sheet
music) tell the structural genes (the keys) when to be active
(expressed) and for how long. For example, humans and
mice both have the gene that allows mice to grow a tail. In
humans, this gene is not activated during embryogenesis,
hence humans have no tail. (Evidence for this is found in
the fact that, very rarely, this gene will be turned on in
humans and the baby will be born with a tail.) Figure 1,
from the early 20th century primatologist Adolph H
Schultz, shows the position of the thumb and length of the
fingers for various primates. These traits can be determined
by how long a gene or set of genes is activated for thus
allowing the thumb position to migrate down the hand or
the fingers to lengthen.
There are other differences among species and almost
all are related to evolution. Table 1 [57-59] shows some
differences in the composition of enzymes that metabolize
drugs. Different enzymes metabolize different drugs,




Human Monkey Dog Rat Mouse
1 A 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2
2 A 6, 7, 13 23, 24 13, 25 1, 2, 3 4, 5, 12,
22












2 D 6 1, 7, 42 15 1-5, 18 9-13, 22,
26, 34, 40
2 E 1 1 1 1 1









Cytochrome P450 (CYP) is a superfamily of enzymes and are the major drug-
metabolizing enzymes.
CYP enzymes are categorized as CYP letter_number_letter. The first number is
the gene family, the letter is the subfamily, and the final number is the
individual gene. Some subfamilies have enzymes from several different genes.
(Adopted and based on data from [58-60]).
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ferent metabolites, all of which influence toxicity and dos-
ing. There are also differences in how many copies of a
drug-metabolizing gene various animals have. If species A
has 10 copies and species B has one copy, then species A
might metabolize a drug 10 times faster than species B.
This also has significance for dosing and for toxicity. For
example, trastuzumab (Herceptin), an anti-breast cancer
drug, is prescribed for women who carry multiple copies
of, or overexpress, the gene HER-2/neu [60].
Species, and even individual humans, can differ in gen-
etic composition. For example, there may be differences in
 The presence (or absence) of certain genes.
 The presence (or absence) of certain alleles.
 The background genes and modifier genes that influence
the genes being perturbed by drugs or disease.
 The regulation and expression of genes.
 Gene networks.
 Alternative splicing, which allows one gene to form
or be part of forming many different proteins.
 Proteins and protein–protein interactions.
 Gene–protein interactions.
 Old genes evolving to perform new functions.
 Horizontal gene transfer (HGT). HGT occurs when
genes from one organism are incorporated into another
organism without the recipient organisms being the
offspring of the donor. For example, resistance to anti-
bacterial drugs can occur through HGT.
 Epigenetics. Epigenetics is the relatively new field
that studies changes in gene expression that can beinherited and that occur without changing the
underlying DNA sequence. For example, because of
environmental influences, a regulatory gene may be
changed such that it is turned on or off thus
allowing a disease to manifest.
 The presence of gene and chromosomal mutations
such as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs),
copy number variants (CNVs), duplications,
inversions, deletions, and insertions.
n response to a perturbation to the system, such as a
drug or disease, even one of the above differences can
result in life or death consequences. Furthermore,
convergent evolution can result in the same trait being
present but being mediated by very different pathways in
different species. Different molecules can also perform
the same function. All of these types of differences are
present in every species.
There are, of course, similarities among species. Some of
these similarities are referred to as conserved processes,
which are basic functions of a cell that have been present
since early evolutionary times. The homeobox, described
above, is an example of a conserved process. Conserved
processes occur in living complex systems that have differ-
ences like those outlined above. These differences result in
the conserved process being influenced by various factors
that are unique to each species and even each individual
within each species. Importantly, we understand how
modifications in the genome, like those mentioned above,
have resulted in the evolution of different body types and
indeed different species [52,61-63]. Therefore, even when
animals and humans share genes and traits, they will most
likely still react differently to diseases and drugs.
The second major change in science that is relevant to
our discussion is the development of chaos and complexity
theories, replacing outmoded deterministic paradigms. For
centuries, physics, and science in general, saw the world
through Newton’s eyes. Newtonian physics is closely con-
nected to reductionism and determinism. Reductionism
maintains that everything can be reduced to its component
parts, those parts examined and understood, and then the
whole explained based on it being the sum of the parts.
Determinism means that once for certain systems, once
the initial conditions are known only one outcome is pos-
sible. Reductionism and determinism lead to a very linear
process with A leading to B leading to C and so on. The
Newtonian physics of inclined planes, velocities, forces, a
point representing an object, and so forth explores simple
systems amenable to reductionism and determinism. The
early 20th century saw advances in science that challenged
reductionism and determinism. For instance, relativity and
quantum mechanics revolutions in physics could not be
explained by reductionism. Later in the 20th century chaos
and complexity science would be developed, thus changing
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of science.
Reductionism worked very well for science and still
has a role to play. But some systems are not the simple
systems that conform so well to study by reductionism.
Some systems are complex systems and have rules and
characteristics of their own. Complex systems are more
than merely a sum of their component parts. Complexity
is related to chaos theory. Chaos is perhaps best under-
stood by examining the original experiments performed
by Lorenz in 1961. While running weather simulations
on a computer, Lorenz shorted a number in an equation
from six decimal places to three. When he re-ran the
program he found the results were very different from
the original. Translating from computer-speak, what he
found was that where it had been sunny on day 15, it
now rained. Because of the extremely small change in
the initial conditions of the program, the outcome was
essentially the opposite from the original. This very
small change in initial conditions is what phrases like “a
butterfly flaps its wings in China and causes a tornado in
Kansas” are referring to. Seemingly unimportant differ-
ences between two situations or systems can translate
into major differences in outcomes. For example, you
may eat chocolate but it can kill your dog. The reason
for this is the fact that dogs lack the enzyme, or have the
enzyme but only in very small quantities, that metabo-
lizes a potentially toxic ingredient in chocolate known as
theobromine. Something as simple as the presence or
absence of an enzyme can have fatal consequences.
Lorenz’s computer experiment, along with work done
by other scientists including Poincaré, gave rise to chaos
theory and complexity theory. A major difference be-
tween chaotic systems and complex systems is that cha-
otic systems are deterministic. Given enough computer
power and knowledge of the system, outcomes could be
predicted. This is not the case with complex systems be-
cause they exhibit, among other things, emergent proper-
ties. Emergence is the presence, in a system, of new
properties that could not have been predicted even with
total knowledge of the component parts from which the
emergent property arose. Financial markets, the behavior
of ant colonies, cells, and living organisms are examples
of complex systems whereas the weather and the red
spot on Jupiter are examples of chaotic systems.
Complex systems, including humans and other ani-
mals, have the following characteristics:
1. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts. This
is, in part, because of emergent properties. Because
complex systems exhibit the characteristics of
emergence and the whole being greater than the sum
of its parts, they cannot be completely described via
reductionism.2. Different levels of organization exist and a
perturbation to the system as a whole may affect
each level differently.
3. There are a large number of components or parts
and these can combine to form modules that interact
with each other and the environment. Feedback
loops also exist among the parts and modules.
4. The system displays robustness, meaning it is
resistant to change, and redundancy, meaning that
the loss of one part may be compensated for by
another part.
5. Complex systems are best described by differential
equations and are examples of nonlinearity.
Nonlinearity means that a small perturbation may
have no effect on the system or a very large effect.
Cause does not give rise to effect in the linear way it
does in a simple system.
6. The particular manifestations of complex systems
and chaotic systems are both determined in part or
in whole by initial conditions. For example, changing
or deleting just one gene in a living complex system
might result in death or in no noticeable change
whatsoever. This has important implications as
studies have demonstrated that deleting a gene in a
mouse may result in the death of one strain but not
another. Similarly, a gene may be required for human
development but not the development of mice or
other animals.
Humans and animals are living complex systems that
have different evolutionary trajectories. Therefore, animals
and humans have very different initial conditions in the
form of the genetic differences listed above. It follows that
one species may respond to perturbations such as drugs
and disease in a manner that cannot be predicted based
the response of a different species. Moreover, all of the
characteristics of a complex system, and the differences
between complex systems that have occurred because of
evolution, have a major impact on inter-species extrapola-
tion. This was not appreciated during the era of the
Nuremberg trials. Predicting outcomes within a complex
system is problematic; predicting an outcome for one
complex system based on the outcome from another is
virtually impossible. Nevertheless, this is exactly what
scientists are attempting to do when they test a drug on a
mouse or monkey in an attempt to ascertain what it will
do to a human.
With the above in mind, we will now examine the
results—the empirical evidence—of attempting to predict
human outcomes by using animals in toxicity testing.
Science – empirical evidence
Paracelsus [64] pointed in the 16th century that it is the
dose of a chemical that determines whether it is toxic.
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nistered in the right dose and all chemicals have a dose
at which no adverse effects are observed. Too much oxy-
gen, e.g., breathing 100% oxygen for several days, will
damage the lungs. Too much water will cause seizures
due to electrolyte imbalances. Conversely, one molecule
of arsenic is not going to kill you. All medications can
likewise cause harm if given at too high of a dose. So
how can we determine when a chemical will be toxic
and to whom it will be toxic? Goldstein and Henifin
have identified three problems in evaluating drugs in de-
velopment. First, they explain that toxicity is determined
in part by other properties of the drug such as absorp-
tion, distribution, metabolism, and elimination [65].
Drugs are evaluated for Absorption (A), distribution (D),
metabolism (M), and excretion or elimination (E), col-
lectively referred to as ADMET, by various methods
including animal models. The second problem is that
these properties vary considerably among humans.
Indeed, humans vary so much in our response to chemi-
cals that the majority of drugs are only an option for a
minority of patients. Some people will tolerate the drug,
but the drug will not be effective for them. Others will
not tolerate the drug, because of toxicities, even though
the drug would have been effective. According to Roses:
“The vast majority of drugs - more than 90% - only work
in 30 or 50% of the people” [66]. Physicians have long
known that there were differences in disease susceptibil-
ity and drug response among ethnic groups, [32-38] be-
tween the sexes, [39-43] and even between monozygotic
twins [67-70]. These facts alone should give us pause
when considering using animals as models for humans.
For which humans are we assuming the animal will pre-
dict a response?
The problem of intra-human variation has led to a
new area in medicine called personalized medicine. Per-
sonalized medicine is the concept of matching disease
susceptibility and drug response to genotype in order to
individualize patient care. This is already occurring with
some drugs and diseases [71-81]. Considering the fact
that there is so much intra-species variation in response
to perturbations like drugs and disease, it is highly un-
likely that attempting to derive toxicity and efficacy data
from another species will be productive.
This leads us to problem number three, which as
Goldstein and Henifin explain is that extrapolation
across species is unreliable [65]. Despite the aforemen-
tioned problems, Goldstein and Henifin assure society
that: “the toxic responses in laboratory animals are use-
ful predictors of toxic responses in humans” [65].
(Emphasis added.) Unfortunately, this sentiment is com-
mon in the scientific literature. After explaining why ani-
mal models should not be predictive, the authors usually
feel obliged to place a disclaimer at the end of the articlesaying society should continue to support animal-based
research. (For more on this see [46].) Such obviously
conflicting statements contribute much to society’s con-
fusion about the value of animal models.
The presumed ability of animals to predict human re-
sponse lays at the foundation of statements like the above
and the Nuremberg Code. It is merely assumed that animal
models can predict human response. Moreover, scientists
and advocates for using animal models actively proclaim
that animal models are predictive. Consider the following
from Gad, writing in Animal Models in Toxicology:
Biomedical sciences’ use of animals as models [is to]
help understand and predict responses in humans, in
toxicology and pharmacology . . . by and large animals
have worked exceptionally well as predictive models for
humans . . . Animals have been used as models for
centuries to predict what chemicals and environmental
factors would do to humans. . .. The use of animals as
predictors of potential ill effects has grown since that
time . . . If we correctly identify toxic agents (using
animals and other predictive model systems) in advance
of a product or agent being introduced into the
marketplace or environment, generally it will not be
introduced . . . The use of thalidomide, a sedative-
hypnotic agent, led to some 10,000 deformed children
being born in Europe. This in turn led directly to the
1962 revision of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
requiring more stringent testing. Current testing
procedures (or even those at the time in the United
States, where the drug was never approved for human
use) would have identified the hazard and prevented
this tragedy [82]. (Emphasis added.)
While the above is not subtle, neither is it unique. Hau
states in the Handbook of Laboratory Animal Science:
A third important group of animal models is employed
as predictive models. These models are used with the
aim of discovering and quantifying the impact of a
treatment, whether this is to cure a disease or to assess
toxicity of a chemical compound [83].
Michael F. Jacobson, executive director of the Center
for Science in the Public Interest noted in 2008: “We
must test animals to determine whether a substance
causes cancer” [84]. Similarly, Huff et al. observe:
“Chemical carcinogenesis bioassays in animals have long
been recognized and accepted as valid predictors of po-
tential cancer hazards to humans” [85]. There are many
more examples, as the predictivity of animal models is
currently a widely accepted paradigm in science.
Before we examine the actual empirical evidence, we
need to explain how a practice, method, or modality is
Table 3 Three-way toxicity test results
Man Toxic effects found in man 53
Toxic effects found in man only 23
Rat Toxic effects also found in man 18
Toxic effects not found in man 19
Dog Toxic effects also found in man 29
Toxic effects not found in man 24
Rat 19 false positives
35 false negatives
Sn= 18/(18 + 35) = 34%
PPV= 18/(18 + 19) = 49%
Dog 24 false positives
24 false negatives
Sn= 29/(29 + 24) = 55%
PPV= 29/(29 + 24) = 55%.
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dictive. Any practice can be assessed. Whether the prac-
tice is a medical test, a medical therapy, or a method
that lies outside of medical science—for example, how
well a drug-sniffing dog performs his job—the modality
can be assessed in the following manner. One calculates
the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value
(PPV), and negative predictive value (NPV) of the prac-
tice by using the values and calculations in Table 2. PPV
refers to the rate at which some intervention correctly
predicts the existence of some factor, whereas negative
predictive value refers to the rate at which some inter-
vention correctly predicts the inexistence of some factor.
In medical science, a practice is not predictive unless it
has a very high PPV and/or NPV. (Some tests are used
only to test whether the trait in question is not present,
hence require only a high NPV.) Values around 0.9 or
above on a scale of 0 to 1 (in other words, highly posi-
tively or negatively predictive) are needed in medical sci-
ence and medical practice.
One final note before we examine actual test results.
Some people misinterpret a PPV of 0.5 or 50% as mean-
ing that the test allows scientists to abandon 50% of the
drugs that would have injured humans or that drugs as a
whole are 50% safer than they would otherwise have
been. Such interpretations are incorrect. A PPV of 0.5
means that the probability that any given toxic reaction
that was seen in animal will be seen in a human is 50%.
That is equivalent to tossing a coin in order to deter-
mine whether to proceed with development. PPVs of this
value are not even remotely useful in medical science.
We will now examine the empirical evidence in order
to determine whether animal models can, in fact, be
used to predict human response. We will focus on the
use of animals in drug development.Table 2 Binary classification test
Gold Standard
GS+ GS-
Test T+ TP FP
T- FN TN
Sensitivity = TP/(TP + FN)
Specificity = TN/(FP + TN)
Positive Predictive Value= TP/(TP + FP)
Negative Predictive Value = TN/(FN+ TN)
Allows calculations for determining how well a test or practice compares with
reality or the gold standard.
T- = Test negative.
T + = Test positive.
FP = False positive.
TP = True positive.
FN = False negative.
TN= True negative.
GS- =Gold standard negative.
GS += Gold standard positive.In 1962, Litchfield [86] studied rats, dogs, and humans
in order to evaluate responses to six drugs. Only side
effects that could be studied in animals were calculated.
89 physical signs were evaluated in the three species.
The results are in Table 3.
The rat gave a PPV of 0.49 while the dog gave a PPV of
0.55. A PPV around 0.5 is not sufficient to qualify a modal-
ity as predictive. It is what one would expect from tossing
a coin. Medical science demands values around 0.9 or
higher. As we will see, the results from using animal mod-
els to predict human response have not changed over the
decades. Animal-based testing and research is not resulting
in better predictive values for humans.
A specific example from the 1960s is Isuprel (iso-
proterenol), which is a medication used to treat asthma. It
proved devastatingly toxic for humans in the amounts
recommended based on animal studies. Thirty five hun-
dred asthmatics died in Great Britain alone. It is still diffi-
cult to reproduce these results in animals [87-93]. With
respect to the futility of animal models for testing iso-
proterenol, scientists commented that “[i]ntensive toxico-
logical studies with rats, guinea pigs, dogs and monkeys at
dosage levels far in excess of current commercial metered
dose vials have not elicited similar results” [89].
In 1978, Fletcher reported on 45 recently developed new
drugs, estimating that only up to 25% of the toxic effects
observed in animal studies were expected to occur in
humans [94]. Since the raw data from this study is not avail-
able, it is impossible to calculate PPV and NPV. However,
data from animal models that leads to a mere 25% of
observed toxic effects being seen in humans denotes the mo-
dality is not predictive. Likewise, Heywood in 1981 reported
the results of toxicity testing in rodents and non-rodents for
50 compounds and found a 20% correlation. He conc-
luded that inter-species extrapolation was unrealistic [95].
Heywood described a follow-up study in 1983 in which dogs
and rats were both studied for toxicity and correlations of less
than 50% were demonstrated [96]. Note that a correlation of
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ment tool, correlation is more akin to sensitivity (see Table 2).
A high sensitivity does not equal a high PPV. Regardless,
even if the PPV had been 50%, this would mean that, per
Table 2, the practice is not predictive for medical science.
David Salsburg of Pfizer addressed carcinogen testing in
1983. He reported on the results of testing 170 com-
pounds. He observed that the animal-based tests lacked
specificity and sensitivity. He stated that the lifetime feed-
ing study in rodents had less probability of finding known
human carcinogens than tossing a coin [97]. Garattini
reviewed the literature in 1985, in addition to reporting
that his results from testing caffeine in mice, rats, rabbits,
monkeys and humans varied widely. He concluded that
even in the presence of equal concentrations of metabo-
lites, the effects vary among species because of differing
sensitivities and hence extrapolations among species
would be specious [98].
In 1990, Heywood reported on drugs that proved so
toxic they were withdrawn from clinical trials or the
market in the UK. Heywood noted that animal data cor-
related with human data for severe adverse drug reac-
tions 14% of the time. He estimated that the animal
correlation rate in general for adverse reactions that oc-
curred in humans ranged between five and 25% [[99]
p57-67]. Obviously any value in this range, even if it
were a PPV as opposed to correlation, is not sufficient
for a test to qualify as predictive. Moreover, the
Heywood report draws attention to another flaw in such
studies. The data from animals was taken as a collective,
meaning that any animal that corresponded the same as
humans was counted as a positive. In order to conduct a
true analysis, the species would have to be categorized
individually and each result counted just for that species.
Species could then be combined, for example a side ef-
fect that occurred in either dog or monkey could be
counted as such, but that would have to be made clear
and the negatives would also count in the calculations
described in Table 2. This would give a much smaller
predictive value than a 14% correlation portrays. This is
why in many animal-based studies, for example Olson
2000 [100], report correlation or concordance among
many species as if it were one value—one value for the
animal model per se—instead of values for each species
or a combination of species.
A similar study examined six drugs, the side effects of
which were already known in humans. The study found
that at least one species demonstrated correlations for
22 side effects, but incorrectly identified 48 side effects
that did not occur in humans, while missing 20 side
effects that did occur in humans. This translates to a
PPV of 0.31 [[101] p73].
In one small series, also reported in 1990, that studied
drugs cancelled during clinical trials because of toxicity, itwas found that in 16 out of 24 (67%) of the cases, the
toxicity had no correlation in animals [[102] p49–56]. A
1994 study revealed that only six of 114 clinical toxicities
had animal correlates [[103] p57-67] and there are many
more examples of this theme in the literature [104] [[105]
p67-74] [106-110]. While the data does not allow the cal-
culations in Table 2 to be made, obviously these numbers
fall far short of qualifying as a predictive medical test. In
1995, Lin compared pharmacologically important para-
meters in different species and pointed out that many
examples of animal models predicting human response
were in fact retrospective and hence not predictive at all
[111].
Many of the most commonly used animal-based tests,
like the Draize test (in which a substance is placed in a
restrained animal’s eye and the effects observed) and the
LD50 (in which a substance is administered to a group
of animals and the dose at which half of them die is
recorded), were never considered predictive for humans
[112,113]. Dawson et al. studied the role of pesticides in
suicide attempts and suicides in Sri Lanka, where pesti-
cides are commonly used for suicide because they are in-
expensive and widely available. They found that the
WHO toxicity ranking, based on LD50 in rats, did not
correlate to toxicity in humans. In other words, the
accepted toxicity rating for these pesticides—and any
consequent policy—was false because it was based on
rat studies that did not correctly predict toxicity in
humans. The herbicide Paraquat, for example, was far
more lethal in humans than would have been anticipated
by the LD50 [114,115].
The results from toxicity testing are not unique in lacking
predictive value. In 1989, Sietsema summarized the com-
parative pharmacology literature concerning the bioavail-
ability of over 400 drugs (see Figure 2, created by authors
using data from Sietsema). This graph exhibits a pattern
called a scattergram, meaning that the pattern is what one
would expect from a shotgun blast—no correlation whatso-
ever and clearly no predictive capacity. While conceding
that relative comparisons might be made between species,
Sietsema concluded that “[i]n general, absolute oral bio-
availability does not correlate well between species” [116].
By the 2000s, the pharmaceutical industry was acknow-
ledging the inability of animal models to predict human
response [117]. Browne and Taylor noted in 2002 that
greater than 50% of drugs that fail in clinical trials do so
because of efficacy or toxicity, both of which rely on
animal models. They also noted that before being recalled,
a number of drugs released between 1997 and 1998 were
given to approximately 20 million patients in the US. Thus
20 million people were exposed to potentially life-
threatening prescription drugs [118]. Sankar, in 2005,
pointed out a less appreciated but no less troubling fact
about animal testing, observing that many drugs that
Figure 2 Variation in bioavailability among species.
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failed some aspect of animal testing and thus patients had
lost the use of those drug [110]. The US National Cancer
Institute has stated that efficacious anti-cancer drugs have
been lost secondary to animal studies [119].
The number one reason for canceling drugs in clin-
ical trials and one of the top reasons for withdrawal of
drugs is hepatotoxicity, which is chemical-induced
liver damage [117,120-122]. Fourches et al. analyzed
MEDLINE abstracts for 1061 compounds known to
cause hepatotoxicity and discovered that the concord-
ance between species was only 39-44% [123]. (Con-
cordance, like correlation, simply means that an effect
was reproduced in an animal species not that the ani-
mal had that percentage for predictive values. Also, as
we noted in the Heywood report, any instance of the
same effect in any species was counted as a positive.)
Many studies have been published outlining the count-
less differences between species that impact on pre-
dicting toxicity [124-139].
First-in-human (FIH) studies are the first clinical trials
in which a drug is tested in humans after being tested in
animals. FIH dosage estimates from animal studies have
not been accurately predicted. One of the most notable
failures was the first time the drug TGN1412 was admi-
nistered. TGN1412 was a CD28 superagonist antibody
designed for patients suffering from autoimmune dis-
eases. Despite a dose of less than 1/500th of that indi-
cated by the animal species the most sensitive to
TGN1412, six human volunteers ended up in the inten-
sive care unit with acute, profound toxicity from
TGN1412 [140,141]. Other FIM trials have resulted in
deaths [142,143]. Chapman [142] states that: “A major
factor complicating risk analysis in FIH trials is thedifficulty of making accurate predictions from preclin-
ical laboratory research on human tissues and animal
studies of the likely effect of the investigational agent on
humans.” Chapman refers to the Horstmann study
[144] that examined Phase I trials for cancer therapy
and found that found that “15 percent of subjects in
trials of single chemotherapy agents experienced serious
but nonfatal toxic events.” Fifty-eight deaths were also
discovered in this study.
Chapman goes on to describe the various ways this in-
ability to make accurate predictions can lead to harm.
First, animal models can fail to predict an adverse effect
that does occur in humans. Second, a drug may be effi-
cacious in an animal model but not in humans, thus ex-
posing humans to the risks associated with the drug
despite having no possible good come from taking the
drug. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies and consu-
mers bear the vast expense of the failed drug develop-
ment. Finally, animal models may demonstrate adverse
effects that humans would not have suffered, and an
otherwise good drug will be withdrawn from develop-
ment. Again, both pharmaceutical companies and, more
importantly, patients are harmed by this.
Scientists try to match the animal species most likely
to react like humans to the drug being tested. This is
fanciful, however, as animals and humans are complex
systems, and much that is needed to be known in order
to determine how humans will respond cannot be
known until after the drug is tested on them. Hence it is
impossible to know which animal species will resemble
humans until after the fact. Moreover, as we pointed
out, the profound variation among humans also limits
the predictive possibilities for animal models. Lavery
states that, for these reasons, animal models are poor
Greek et al. BMC Medical Ethics 2012, 13:16 Page 12 of 17
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/13/16predictors for human response [145] and unsuitable for
demonstrating “proof of principle” [146]. Giri and Bader
summarize the situation saying: “Clearly, drug testing on
animals is unrealistic and causes unforeseen reactions in
human clinical trials” [117].
This lack of predictive ability in drug development
extends to animal models of disease. Enna and Williams
have identified as a major hurdle in translational medi-
cine—the branch of medicine that translates knowledge
from divergent areas of study into effective public health
interventions—the fact that most animal models of dis-
ease lack predictive value for humans [147]. Shapiro
supported this in terms of using mice to study emphy-
sema [148] while Rangarajan and Weinberg reported
that numerous genetic differences exist between mouse
cancer and human cancers stating that there are “funda-
mental differences” in the pathophysiology of cancer
[149]. Weinberg was also quoted in Fortune magazine as
saying animal models of cancer have little predictive
value for humans [150]. Lindl et al. studied animal
experiments performed in Germany from 1991 to 1993
and found that every hypothesis that came from animal
models during this time failed in humans or was not
tested [132].
We note for the record that models are successfully
used in science on a daily basis and that animals can be
used for many purposes in science and research. One of
the authors has discussed this in previous publications
[46-48,151]. Animal models may effectively be used as
heuristics, as a source of tissues for humans, and for dis-
covering more about life in general. However these spe-
cific uses are not the topic of this paper.
The implications
In order to ascertain whether animal models are predictive
for humans, one must analyze all the available data or at
least enough to make a scientifically valid conclusion, ra-
ther than simply cherry picking supportive instances. Cit-
ing instances in which animals and humans responded
similarly to a perturbation and concluding that animals
are therefore useful in predicting outcomes from drugs or
diseases is an example of the fallacy of insufficient statis-
tics, the proof by example fallacy, or the base rate fallacy.
Such fallacious reasoning results in the data being inaccur-
ately presented, and false conclusions are inevitable. The
preceding sections, as well as other data and articles, dem-
onstrate unequivocally that animals cannot predict human
response to drugs and disease.
Claims that “either we test on animals or we test on
people” are similarly fallacious, presenting a false di-
lemma or false dichotomy. In reality, there are degrees
of human testing and all require informed consent and
must pass ethics committees. Human-based research
and testing is not ipso facto unethical and in fact occursevery day. Some of the drug testing that is performed
on animals is currently being done with humans in the
form of microdosing, which is the administration of
miniscule and non-dangerous doses of a substance to
observe how it behaves in a human body [152-154].
One method of ensuring a safe starting dose for micro-
dosing, since data from animal models is not sufficient,
would be to begin administration in the picogram to
nanogram (ng) range and increase appropriately. Even
known toxic substances have a non-toxic dosage to
serve as a starting point. For example, botulinum toxin
is the most neurotoxic substance known and is toxic to
adult humans in doses around 50-100 ng.
Current human-based testing also involves humans who
have agreed to test new drugs. Ironically, as animal studies
are not predictive for humans, the first clinical trials of a
new drug in humans are themselves the most risky form of
human-based research being performed in a large-scale
manner today. Citing the results from animal studies in
order to calm the fears of the human test subjects is uneth-
ical. Other examples of ethical human-based research and
testing include observational studies such as those per-
formed in the field of epidemiology, traditional clinical re-
search in which two treatments are compared in three or
more groups of patients. Human tissues are also used for
testing and research. Human DNA is currently being stud-
ied in order to match genes with drug effects. Human
experimentation in Nazi Germany is but one type of
human-based research and is the exception to an otherwise
ethical rule that protects humans from being harmed and/
or being tested on without consent. The false dichotomy
between human- and animal-based research equates all
human-based research with that which occurred in Nazi
Germany. This causes even the most ethical and promising
of human-based research to appear as if it were unethical,
and its proponents anti-human. In fact, the opposite is true.
A fundamental principle in research ethics is that re-
search subjects must give their informed consent to partici-
pate in a study. In other words, they must freely volunteer.
We need to briefly address the use of the word volunteer in
the context of human-based research. To put it bluntly, it is
completely disingenuous. Although the government and
ethics committees require that people volunteer for a study,
they are generally compensated. The dominant narrative to
explain this practice is that society is not paying people to
test drugs but is instead “reimbursing” them for their time
and trouble. However, the element of compensation voids
any possibility that consent is freely given in the true sense:
research participants volunteer, for the most part, for the
money. In fact, there are people who participate in studies
as a full-time job. The truth is that society allows people to
take risks for money [155].
Although written with the best of intentions and based
on the science of the era, the Nuremberg Code set in
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current research being conducted in an unethical manner.
The results from animal-based research have been shown
empirically to be invalid for predicting human response
and this is supported and explained by theory from evolu-
tion and complexity science. Mandating animal-based re-
search and testing is not only unnecessary, but also results
in scientists being misled about important aspects of
human pathophysiology. The mandate of animal-based re-
search and testing has resulted in human harm in the fol-
lowing ways:
1. Directly, in the form of an assumption of safety when
in fact the drug or procedure is harmful to humans.
2. Indirectly, when the drug or procedure would have
been of benefit to humans but was withheld because
of adverse reactions or lack of efficacy in animals.
3. Indirectly, by misleading scientists into pursuing lines
of research that proved futile and/or harmful to
humans. This is especially pertinent in light of the
fact that human-based research would not have been
misleading and would in fact have been informative.
4. Indirectly, in the form of consuming resources, such
as scientists and funding, that could have been used
in productive areas of research [156,157].
Moreover, the perpetuation of the myth that animal
models ensure safety of drugs and procedures has led to
society allowing the use of sentient animals in research
when they would not otherwise have done so [48,158-161].
Giles writing in Nature states:
In the contentious world of animal research, one
question surfaces time and again: how useful are
animal experiments as a way to prepare for trials of
medical treatments in humans? The issue is crucial, as
public opinion is behind animal research only if it
helps develop better drugs. Consequently, scientists
defending animal experiments insist they are essential
for safe clinical trials, whereas animal-rights activists
vehemently maintain that they are useless [162].
(Emphasis added.)
There are ethical implications any time society is being
misled, and in particular when it is being done in order
to continue a process in which large sums of money are
involved [48].
There are other financial implications. Scientists are
choosing to conduct research using animals because
grants are easier to obtain and the research is overall eas-
ier than conducting human-based research [156]. More-
over, scientists with a history of funding are the ones who
eventually sit on funding committees. As long as this situ-
ation persists, the process will continue to be self-perpetuating. When animal-based research is analyzed in
light of the fact that living organisms are complex systems
with different evolutionary trajectories, there will be major
changes in the funding of biomedical research. Given the
fact that this is an enterprise that consumes over one-
hundred billion dollars annually just in the US, there is,
unsurprisingly, resistance to change from parties with a
vested interest in the status quo [163].
The financial implications are also closely tied to an-
other aspect of the ethical implications. The research
funding pie is finite. Every dollar spent on research
using animal models is a dollar that does not go to
human-based research, the basic sciences of chemistry
and physics, or to engineering. These are the areas
that have been most productive for discovering new
treatments and other interventions [157]. Since there
is such a broad discrepancy between the efficacy of
human-based research and basic research in terms of
advancing medical care [157,164,165], funding research
that uses animal models is actually unethical in respect
of humans.
The legal ramifications of the science discussed above
are already being manifest. Courts are experts at asses-
sing the value of evidence and its ability to demonstrate
truth and causation. For example, in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals [166], the US Supreme Court
ruled that judges have the discretion to preclude
animal-based research from being admitted when better
evidence—in this case, epidemiological evidence—is
available. Many US courts have ruled that since animal
tests are not predictive for humans they cannot be ad-
mitted as evidence [166-170].
In discussions of this nature, invariably the question is
raised: “What do you propose as an alternative” There are
two points to be made in addressing this question. First,
animal models simply fail as predictive modalities to the
standards of medical science regardless of what else is
available. This is not a unique situation in medical science.
Many tests and interventions have been tested, found in-
adequate, and therefore discarded even though better
options were not available. There is a reason primum non
nocere is frequently cited in medicine. Second, progress is
being made in finding tests that are predictive for patients.
There is essentially universal agreement that predictive
technologies will be human-based. This can be in the form
of gene-based testing vis-à-vis microarrays, in silico testing
[171] based on structure-activity relationships [172], quanti-
tative structure-activity relationship (QSAR) [173], and
using human stem cell [174,175], among other options
[176] and combinations of options. Testing of intact living
humans is currently in use in the form of microdosing and
offers the possibility for expansion for other types of testing.
Regardless of how predictive testing develops, it will in all
likelihood be human-based [110,177-180].
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number of animals used in testing and refine the testing
methods in order to make the procedures less painful.
While our discussion does not directly relate to this
topic, it should be acknowledged that many in the scien-
tific community have been involved in areas related to
animal welfare.
Summary
The Nuremberg Code was written in an era when it
appeared to scientists that the similarities among mamma-
lian species outweighed the differences. Today, in part due
to advances in evolutionary biology and complexity theory,
science has more knowledge about inter- and intra-species
differences, and this knowledge falsifies the premises upon
which the Nuremberg Code was based. Empirical evidence
supports this. The only ethical option for society, and in-
deed the one most valuable for future medical advance-
ment, is to replace animal-based research with modalities
that demonstrate promise for drug development and dis-
ease treatment. Accordingly, policies and procedures that
institutionalize animal-based research should be reformed.
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